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Abstract
We consider the problem of governing systemic risk in an assets-liabilities
dynamical model of banking system. In the model considered each bank is
represented by its assets and its liabilities. The capital reserves of a bank are
the difference between assets and liabilities of the bank. A bank is solvent
when its capital reserves are greater or equal to zero otherwise the bank is
failed. The banking system dynamics is defined by an initial value problem for
a system of stochastic differential equations whose independent variable is time
and whose dependent variables are the assets and the liabilities of the banks.
The banking system model presented generalizes those discussed in [4], [3] and
describes a homogeneous population of banks. The main features of the model
are a cooperation mechanism among banks and the possibility of the (direct)
intervention of the monetary authority in the banking system dynamics. We
call systemic risk or systemic event in a bounded time interval the fact that in
that time interval at least a given fraction of the banks fails. The probability of
systemic risk in a bounded time interval is evaluated using statistical simula-
tion. The systemic risk governance pursues the goal of keeping the probability
of systemic risk in a bounded time interval between two given thresholds. The
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monetary authority is responsible for the systemic risk governance. The gov-
ernance consists in the choice of the assets and of the liabilities of a kind of
“ideal bank” as functions of time and in the choice of the rules that regulate
the cooperation mechanism among banks. These rules are obtained solving
an optimal control problem for the pseudo mean field approximation of the
banking system model. The governance induces the banks of the system to
behave like the “ideal bank”. Shocks acting on the assets or on the liabilities
of the banks are simulated. Numerical examples of systemic risk governance in
presence and in absence of shocks acting on the banking system are studied.
1 Introduction
The notion of systemic risk refers to the risk of a collapse of an entire system rather
than simply the failure of individual parts of it. Systemic risk and systemic risk
governance are important research topics that have applications in many different
contexts such as, for example, physics, biology, engineering, finance. We limit our
attention to the modeling of systemic risk in banking systems. For a survey of the
use of mathematical models in the study of systemic risk in a more general context
we refer to [8] and to the references therein.
This paper is concerned with measurement, monitoring and governance of sys-
temic risk in an assets-liabilities dynamical model of banking system. Recently several
dynamical models of banking systems based on stochastic differential equations have
been studied, see, for example, [4], [1], [6], [3]. We present a banking system model
that generalizes those presented in [4], [3] and exploits some ideas taken from [7],
[10], [11], [12]. That is we consider a continuous-time dynamical model of banking
system where each bank holds assets and has liabilities that are stochastic processes
of time. Assets and liabilities of each bank as functions of time are defined implicitly
by an initial value problem for a system of stochastic differential equations. The
capital reserves of a bank are defined as the difference between assets and liabilities
of the bank. A bank is solvent when its capital reserves are greater or equal to zero
otherwise the bank is failed. A political/technical authority is responsible for the
banking system management and, in particular, is responsible for the systemic risk
governance. For convenience we refer to this authority as monetary authority.
The model proposed describes a homogeneous population of banks where each
bank interacts with the other banks and with the monetary authority. Note that the
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homogeneity of the bank population implies that all the banks of the model behave in
the same way. The main features of the model are a cooperation mechanism among
banks that regulates the inter-bank borrowing and lending activity and the possibility
of the (direct) intervention of the monetary authority in the banking system dynamics.
The cooperation mechanism among banks (see [4], [3]) is based on the idea that “who
has more (assets, liabilities) gives to those who have less (assets, liabilities)”. The
intervention of the monetary authority in the banking system dynamics consists in
the choice of two functions representing respectively the assets and the liabilities of a
kind of “ideal bank” as functions of time and in the choice of the rules that regulate
the cooperation mechanism among banks.
In the banking system model proposed realistic situations of banking distress due
to the deterioration of the quality of the assets and/or of the liabilities of the banks
can be modeled. Shocks that hit the banking system are simulated with jumps in the
volatilities of the stochastic differential equations satisfied by the assets and by the
liabilities of the banks and with jumps of the correlation coefficients of the stochastic
differentials of the diffusion terms that appear on the right hand side of the assets
and of the liabilities equations.
We call systemic risk or systemic event in a bounded time interval the fact that
in that time interval at least a given fraction of the banks of the model fails. Given
a banking system model we use statistical simulation to evaluate the probability of
systemic risk in a bounded time interval. The action of the cooperation mechanism
among banks produces a reduction of the default probability of the individual bank
at the expenses of an increment of the default probability of all or almost all the
banks of the banking system. This last event is called “extreme” systemic risk.
When the number of banks of the model goes to infinity a heuristic approxi-
mation of the banking system model called “pseudo mean field approximation” is
introduced. This approximation is inspired to the mean field approximation of sta-
tistical mechanics and is based on the homogeneity of the bank population. The
pseudo mean field approximation is a stochastic dynamical system with two degree
of freedom.
A method to govern the probability of systemic risk in a bounded time interval
is presented. The goal of the governance is to keep the probability of systemic risk in
a bounded time interval between two given thresholds. The governance exploits the
choice made by the monetary authority of the assets and of the liabilities of a kind
of “ideal bank” as functions of time and the solution of a stochastic optimal control
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problem for the pseudo mean field approximation of the banking system model. In
fact in a homogeneous bank population when there are enough banks, all the banks
behave like a kind of “mean bank” and the “mean bank” behaviour is approximated
with the behaviour of the pseudo mean field approximation of the banking system
model. This last behaviour is forced to be similar to the behaviour of the “ideal bank”
solving a stochastic optimal control problem for the pseudo mean field approximation
of the banking system model. Thanks to the homogeneity of the bank population,
the governance of the pseudo mean field approximation is easily translated in the
governance of the entire bank population. More specifically it is translated in the
rules of the cooperation mechanism among banks. In this way the systemic risk
governance induces the individual banks to behave as the ideal bank. Shocks on the
assets and on the liabilities of the banks are simulated and numerical examples of
systemic risk governance in presence and in absence of shocks are presented.
In the scientific literature several banking system models have been suggested.
For example in [4], [1], [3] banking system models consisting in initial value problems
for systems of stochastic differential equations have been studied. In [4], [1] the
dependent variables of the stochastic differential equations that define the model are
the log-monetary reserves of the banks as functions of time and there is a cooperation
mechanism that regulates the borrowing and lending activity among banks. Moreover
the probability of systemic risk in a bounded time interval is studied using the mean
field approximation and the theory of large deviations. The model presented in [3]
generalizes those presented in [4], [1]. In particular in [3] a model with two cooperation
mechanisms is studied. The first cooperation mechanism regulates the borrowing
and lending activity among banks while the second one describes the borrowing and
lending activity between banks and monetary authority. Furthermore a technique
to govern the probability of systemic risk in a bounded time interval is introduced
and studied. In [7], [10], [11], [12] assets-liabilities models of banking systems are
presented. Each bank is modeled by its assets and its liabilities. Time independent
(static) [7], [10] and time dependent (dynamic) [11], [12] assets-liabilities banking
system models have been studied. In [11], [12] the assets and the liabilities of the
banks are further decomposed in the sum of more specific addenda and the time
dynamics of each addendum is specified. Finally in [7], [10] the analogies between
systemic risk in banking systems and systemic risk in several other domains of science
and engineering are explored.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 an assets-liabilities banking system
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model is defined. In Section 3 the definition of systemic risk in a bounded time
interval is given and the implications of the presence of the cooperation mechanism
among banks and of the homogeneity of the bank population on the systemic risk
probability are investigated. In Section 4 the mean field and the pseudo mean field
approximations of the banking system model defined in Section 2 are discussed. In
Section 5 an optimal control problem for the pseudo mean field approximation of
the banking system model is solved and the optimal control found is translated in
the rules that determine the functioning of the cooperation mechanism among banks.
Finally in Section 6 a method to govern systemic risk in a bounded time interval
is presented and some numerical examples of systemic risk governance of banking
systems in presence and in absence of shocks are discussed.
2 The banking system model
Let t be a real variable that denotes time and N > 1 be a positive integer representing
the number of banks present in the banking system model at time t = 0. The
superscript i labels the i-th bank, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . The activities of each bank are
partitioned in the following categories: interbank loans, external assets, deposits and
interbank borrowings. The assets of a bank are made of the interbank loans and of
the external assets of the bank. The liabilities of a bank are made of the deposits
and of the interbank borrowings of the bank. The assets ait of the i-th bank at time
t ≥ 0 are the sum of the interbank loans ιit at time t ≥ 0, and of the external assets
eit at time t ≥ 0, of the i-th bank, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , that is:
ait = ι
i
t + e
i
t, t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (1)
The liabilities lit of the i-th bank at time t ≥ 0 are the sum of the deposits dit at
time t ≥ 0, and of the interbank borrowings bit at time t ≥ 0, of the i-th bank,
i = 1, 2, . . . , N , that is:
lit = d
i
t + b
i
t, t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (2)
The previous four categories of activities are balanced in the bank capital. The
capital reserves or “net worth” of the i-th bank, cit, at time t ≥ 0, are defined as the
difference between assets ait at time t ≥ 0 and liabilities lit at time t ≥ 0, of the i-th
bank, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , that is:
cit = a
i
t − lit, t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (3)
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A bank is solvent when its assets are greater or equal to its liabilities, that is the i-th
bank is solvent at time t ≥ 0, if
cit = a
i
t − lit ≥ 0, t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (4)
When the capital reserves cit, t ≥ 0, of the i-th bank become negative for the first time
during the time evolution the i-th bank is failed, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . The failed banks
are removed from the banking system model. Note that in the models studied in this
paper the assets, the liabilities and the capital reserves of each bank are stochastic
processes of time, in particular this means that the inequality (4) must be considered
on each path of the stochastic process that represents the capital reserves. That is a
bank can be failed on a path of its capital reserves and can be solvent on a different
path of its capital reserves. Equations (1), (2), (3) are a simple model of bank capital,
more advanced models of bank capital can be found, for example, in [2].
In [11], [12] the dynamics of each addendum present on the right hand side of
(1), (2) is specified, instead here we specify only the dynamics of the assets ait, t ≥ 0,
and of the liabilities lit, t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . In fact we assume that the assets and
the liabilities of the banks are stochastic processes of time defined implicitly by the
following system of stochastic differential equations:
dait = a
i
tµadt+ a
i
tσadW
i
t , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (5)
dlit = l
i
tµldt+ l
i
tσldZ
i
t , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (6)
with the initial conditions:
ai0 = a˜
i
0, l
i
0 = l˜
i
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (7)
where σa = σa,t, t > 0, σl = σl,t, t > 0, are piecewise constant positive functions of
time and µa, µl are real constants. In (7) a˜
i
0, l˜
i
0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, are random variables
that, for simplicity, we assume to be concentrated in a point with probability one.
With abuse of notation we use the same symbols to denote the random variables and
the points where the random variables are concentrated. We assume a˜i0 > 0, l˜
i
0 > 0,
a˜i0 − l˜i0 > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , that is we assume that at time t = 0 all the banks are
solvent with probability one.
The stochastic processesW it , Z
i
t , t ≥ 0, in (5), (6) are standard Wiener processes,
such that W i0 = 0, Z
i
0 = 0, and dW
i
t , dZ
i
t , t > 0, are their stochastic differentials,
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i = 1, 2, . . . , N . We assume that:
E(dW it dW
j
t ) = ρ
2
a dt, i 6= j, E(dZ itdZjt ) = ρ2l dt, i 6= j,
E(dW it dW
i
t ) = E(dZ
j
t dZ
j
t ) = dt, E(dW
i
t dZ
j
t ) = 0,
t > 0, i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N, (8)
where E(·) denotes the expected value of ·, and ρa = ρa,t, t > 0, ρl = ρl,t, t > 0,
are piecewise constant functions of time such that |ρa| ≤ 1, |ρl| ≤ 1, t > 0. The
stochastic differentials dW it , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, can be represented as follows:
dW it = ρadW˜
0
t +
√
1− ρ2a dW˜ it , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (9)
where W˜ jt , t ≥ 0, j = 0, 1, . . . , N , are independent standard Wiener processes such
that W˜ j0 = 0, j = 0, 1, . . . , N , and dW˜
j
t , t > 0, j = 0, 1, . . . , N , are their stochastic
differentials. The term dW˜ 0t , t > 0, is called common noise of the assets equations (5).
Similarly the stochastic differentials dZ it , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, can be represented as
follows:
dZ it = ρldZ˜
0
t +
√
1− ρ2l dZ˜ it , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (10)
where Z˜jt , t ≥ 0, j = 0, 1, . . . , N , are independent standard Wiener processes such
that Z˜j0 = 0, j = 0, 1, . . . , N , and dZ˜
j
t , t > 0, j = 0, 1, . . . , N , are their stochastic
differentials. The term dZ˜0t , t > 0, is called common noise of the liabilities equations
(6). Finally we assume that dW˜ it and dZ˜
j
t are independent, t > 0, i, j = 0, 1, . . . , N .
Note that in (8) the correlation coefficients ρ2a, ρ
2
l between the stochastic differen-
tials of the assets equations (5) and of the liabilities equations (6) are non negative.
These non negative correlation coefficients generate the so called “collective” be-
haviour of the banks in presence of a shock and are translated in the representation
formulae of the stochastic differentials (9), (10). The correlation model (8) can be
easily extended to more general situations. In this case the representation formu-
lae (9), (10) must be adapted to the circumstances. For simplicity we omit these
generalizations here.
Note that the diffusion coefficient σa is the same in all the assets equations (5)
and that similar statements hold for the diffusion coefficient σl, for the drift coeffi-
cients µa, µl and for the correlation coefficients ρa, ρl. Moreover let us assume that:
a˜i0 = a˜0, l˜
i
0 = l˜0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , so that we have: a˜0 > 0, l˜0 > 0, a˜0 − l˜0 > 0. With
these assumptions all the banks of the model are equal, that is the bank population
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described by the banking system model (3), (5), (6), (7), (8) is homogeneous. Sys-
tems made of a homogeneous population of “individuals” are studied in statistical
mechanics where the individuals are usually atoms or molecules. In particular ex-
tending the ideas developed in statistical mechanics to the study of banking system
models we show that the homogeneity of the bank population implies that, when N
goes to infinity, all the banks behave in the same way, that is all the banks behave as
a kind of “mean bank” and, using the language of statistical mechanics, the “mean
bank” behaviour is defined by the “mean field” approximation of the banking system
model.
In an assets-liabilities dynamical model of banking system (like model (3), (5),
(6), (7), (8)) it is possible to study the propagation of certain types of shocks. For
example it is possible to model shocks consisting in losses of value of the external
assets of the banks caused by a generalized fall of the market prices of the assets
and/or by a generalized rise of the expected defaults (see, for example, [7], [10]).
These shocks reduce the net worth of all the banks at the same time determining an
abrupt increment of the probability of systemic risk in a bounded time interval. In
model (3), (5), (6), (7), (8) shocks are modeled with jumps of the volatility σa in the
assets equations (5) leaving σl constant in the liabilities equations (6) or viceversa
with jumps of σl leaving σa constant. For simplicity we do not consider jumps of σa
and σl occurring at the same time. That is the shocks acting on the assets and on
the liabilities of the banks are modeled choosing the functions σa = σa,t, t > 0, and
σl = σl,t, t > 0. Moreover in model (3), (5), (6), (7), (8) it is possible to study the
“collective” behaviour of the banks in presence of a shock. In fact when a shock hits
the banking system all the banks react in the same way and this “collective” behaviour
of the banks is modeled with a positive correlation of the stochastic differentials on
the right hand side of the assets equations (5) and/or of the liabilities equations (6).
That is the “collective” behaviour of the banks in reaction to a shock is modeled with
a jump of the functions ρa = ρa,t, t > 0, and/or ρl = ρl,t, t > 0.
Let us adapt to model (3), (5), (6), (7), (8) the mechanisms used in the models
presented in [4], [3] to describe the cooperation among banks and let us introduce the
terms used to describe the intervention of the monetary authority in the banking sys-
tem dynamics. To do this we define the new variables Git, H
i
t , t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
as follows:
Git = ln(a
i
t), H
i
t = ln(l
i
t), t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (11)
where ln(·) is the logarithm of ·. First of all note that the variables Git = ln(ait),
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H it = ln(l
i
t), t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , are well-defined. In fact, at time t = 0, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , N , we have a˜i0 = a˜0 > 0, l˜
i
0 = l˜0 > 0, a˜0 − l˜0 > 0, with probability one,
and therefore equations (5), (6) imply that ait > 0, l
i
t > 0, with probability one, t > 0.
The quantities Git = ln(a
i
t), H
i
t = ln(l
i
t), are, respectively, the log-assets and the
log-liabilities of the i-th bank at time t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Using Itoˆ’s Lemma and equations (5), (6) it is easy to see that the stochastic
processes Git, H
i
t , t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , satisfy the following equations:
dGit =
(
µa − 1
2
σ2a
)
dt+ σadW
i
t , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (12)
dH it =
(
µl − 1
2
σ2l
)
dt+ σldZ
i
t , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (13)
and the initial conditions:
Gi0 = ln(a˜
i
0) = ln(a˜0), H
i
0 = ln(l˜
i
0) = ln(l˜0), i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (14)
Let us define the stochastic processes:
Ait = G
i
t −
(
µat− 1
2
∫ t
0
σ2a,τdτ
)
, t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (15)
Lit = H
i
t −
(
µlt− 1
2
∫ t
0
σ2l,τdτ
)
, t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (16)
from (12), (13), (14) it is easy to see that Ait, L
i
t, t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, satisfy the
following equations:
dAit = σadW
i
t , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (17)
dLit = σldZ
i
t , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (18)
and the initial conditions:
Ai0 = ln(a˜
i
0) = ln(a˜0), L
i
0 = ln(l˜
i
0) = ln(l˜0), i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (19)
Let ψt, t ≥ 0, be a continuous piecewise differentiable function, the notation
dψt =
dψt
dt
dt = (ψt)
′ dt, t > 0, denotes the “piecewise differential” of ψt, t ≥ 0.
Using the ideas developed in [4], [3] we modify the equations (17), (18) and we
introduce the terms used to implement the cooperation mechanism among banks and
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the terms used to model the intervention of the monetary authority in the banking
system dynamics. This is done adding to (17), (18) some drift terms. That is, given
the continuous piecewise differentiable functions ϕt > 0, φt > 0, t ≥ 0, such that
ϕt − φt > 0, t ≥ 0, we replace equations (17), (18), respectively, with the equations:
dAit =
αt
N
N∑
j=1
(
Ajt −Ait
)
dt+ dϕ˜t + σadW
i
t , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (20)
dLit =
γt
N
N∑
j=1
(
Ljt − Lit
)
dt+ dφ˜t + σldW
i
t , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (21)
where the functions ϕ˜t, φ˜t, t ≥ 0, are given by:
ϕ˜t = ln(ϕt)− µat+ 1
2
∫ t
0
σ2a,τdτ, t ≥ 0, (22)
φ˜t = ln(φt)− µlt+ 1
2
∫ t
0
σ2l,τdτ, t ≥ 0. (23)
The equations (20), (21) are completed with the initial conditions (19) and with
the assumptions on the correlation coefficients (8). For later convenience from now
on we assume that: a˜0 = ϕ0, l˜0 = φ0.
The equations (20), (21) are, respectively, the equations that describe the “assets”
and the “liabilities” of the banks. For simplicity the variables Ait, L
i
t, t ≥ 0, are called
respectively “assets” and “liabilities” of the i-th bank, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , instead of being
called centered log-assets and centered log-liabilities as it should be more appropriate.
The functions ϕt, φt, will be interpreted, respectively, as assets and liabilities
of the “ideal bank” at time t, t ≥ 0. The fact that the “ideal bank” is solvent
corresponds to the assumption that ϕt − φt > 0, t ≥ 0. Recall that the functions
ϕ˜t, φ˜t, t ≥ 0, of equations (20), (21) are related to ϕt, φt, t ≥ 0, through (22),
(23). The functions αt ≥ 0, γt ≥ 0, t > 0, of (20), (21) regulate the cooperation
mechanism among banks and their choice corresponds to the choice of the rules of
the cooperation mechanism among banks. Later this choice will be attributed to the
monetary authority and will be used to govern the systemic risk in a bounded time
interval of the banking system model. The initial value problem (20), (21), (19) is
completed with the assumptions (8).
For i = 1, 2, . . . , N the cooperation of the i-th bank with the other banks is
described by the drift terms
αt
N
N∑
j=1
(
Ajt −Ait
)
dt, t > 0, and
γt
N
N∑
j=1
(
Ljt − Lit
)
dt, t > 0,
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respectively, of the i-th equation (20) and of the i-th equation (21). In fact the
term
αt
N
N∑
j=1
(
Ajt −Ait
)
dt, in the i-th equation (20) implies that for t > 0 and j =
1, 2, . . . , N , if at time t bank j has more “assets” than bank i (i.e. if Ajt > A
i
t) assets
flow from bank j to bank i, and this flow is proportional to the difference Ajt − Ait
at the rate
αt
N
, the opposite happens if bank i has more “assets” than bank j (i.e. if
Ajt < A
i
t), j = 1, 2, . . . , N . For i = 1, 2, . . . , N , the term
γt
N
N∑
j=1
(
Ljt − Lit
)
dt, t > 0,
in the i-th equation (21), is relative to the “liabilities” and is analogous of the term
αt
N
N∑
j=1
(
Ajt − Ait
)
dt, t > 0, of the “assets” of the i-th equation (20); this term has the
same effect on the liabilities than the effect that the term
αt
N
N∑
j=1
(
Ajt − Ait
)
dt, t > 0,
has on the assets.
Note that the division by N in the rates
αt
N
,
γt
N
, t > 0, of the drift terms of
equations (20), (21) is a normalization factor taken from the technical literature (see,
for example, [1], [6], [3]) that plays no role in this paper.
The cooperation mechanism added in (20), (21) is a simple implementation of
the idea that “who has more (assets, liabilities) gives to those who have less (assets,
liabilities)”, in this sense it is a cooperation mechanism among banks (see [3]).
The drift terms dϕ˜t, dφ˜t, t > 0, of equations (20), (21) describe the interven-
tion of the monetary authority in the banking system dynamics. In fact the term
dϕ˜t, t > 0, of the equations (20) is responsible for the fact that the drift terms
αt
N
N∑
j=1
(
Ajt − Ait
)
dt, t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, stabilize the trajectories of Ait, t > 0,
i = 1, 2, . . . , N, around the function ϕ˜t, t > 0, and, as a consequence, stabilize the
trajectories of ait, t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, around the function ϕt, t > 0. Analogously
the term dφ˜t, t > 0, of the equations (21) is responsible for the fact that the drift
terms
γt
N
N∑
j=1
(
Ljt − Lit
)
dt, t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, stabilize the trajectories of Lit, t > 0,
i = 1, 2, . . . , N, around the function φ˜t, t > 0, and, as a consequence, stabilize the
trajectories of lit, t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, around the function φt, t > 0. That is when
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αt > 0, γt > 0, t > 0, the drift terms introduced in equations (20), (21) to model the
cooperation mechanism among banks and the intervention of the monetary authority
in the banking system dynamics expressed by the terms dϕ˜t, dφ˜t, t > 0, generate a
“swarming” effect of the trajectories of the assets ait, t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, and of the
liabilities lit, t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, around, respectively, ϕt, φt, t > 0, that is around,
respectively, the assets and the liabilities of the “ideal bank”. This implies that the
trajectories of the capital reserves of the i-th bank swarms around the capital reserves
of the “ideal bank” ξt = ϕt− φt, t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . This swarming effect is a key
ingredient of the systemic risk governance discussed later.
Let us rewrite equations (20), (21), (19) using as dependent variables the stochas-
tic processes Git, H
i
t , t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . We have:
dGit =
αt
N
N∑
j=1
(
Gjt −Git
)
dt+ d ln(ϕt) + σadW
i
t , t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (24)
dH it =
γt
N
N∑
j=1
(
Hjt −H it
)
dt+ d ln(φt) + σldZ
i
t , t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (25)
with the initial conditions:
Gi0 = ln(a˜0), H
i
0 = ln(l˜0), i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (26)
where a˜0 = ϕ0, l˜0 = φ0. To the equations (3), (11), (24), (25), (26) is added the
assumption (8), this completes the banking system model.
For simplicity we use the same symbols to denote the variables of model (3), (5),
(6), (7), (8) and those of model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8). When necessary to
avoid ambiguity we specify the banking system model considered.
Note that when αt = 0, γt = 0, t > 0, and the functions ϕt, φt, t ≥ 0, are
constants, there is no cooperation among banks and no intervention of the monetary
authority in the banking system dynamics. In this case model (3), (11), (24), (25),
(26), (8) reduces to model (3), (5), (6), (7), (8).
3 Systemic risk in a bounded time interval
Given the banking system model (3), (5), (6), (7), (8), or the banking system model
(3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8), we define the events: i) default of a bank in a bounded
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time interval, ii) systemic risk in a bounded time interval and we introduce a prob-
ability distribution called loss distribution of the banks defaulted in a bounded time
interval.
Given 0 ≤ τ1 < τ2 < +∞ and the default level D ≥ 0 we define the event F i[τ1,τ2],
“default of the i-th bank in the time interval [τ1, τ2]”, as follows:
F i[τ1,τ2] =
{
min
τ1≤t≤τ2
cit < D
}
, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (27)
That is for i = 1, 2, . . . , N the i-th bank defaults in the time interval [τ1, τ2] if in that
time interval its capital reserves cit, t ≥ 0, go below the default level D. Recall that in
this paper we have chosen D = 0 and that the inequality min
τ1≤t≤τ2
cit < D is considered
on each path of the stochastic process cit, τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . The failed
banks are removed from the banking system model, this means that the number of
banks present in the model may depend from the path of the banking system model
considered and may not be constant during the time evolution.
Let int [·] be the integer part of the real number ·, and M be a positive integer
such that int
[
N
2
] ≤ M ≤ N . The systemic risk (or systemic event) of type M in the
time interval [τ1, τ2], SR[τ1,τ2], is the event defined as follows:
SRM[τ1,τ2] = {at leastM banks fail in the time interval [τ1, τ2]} . (28)
In this paper we choose M = int
[
N
2
]
+ 1 and we write SR[τ1,τ2] to mean SR
M
[τ1,τ2]
when M = int
[
N
2
]
+ 1.
Let P(·) be the probability of the event ·. Given the banking system model (3),
(5), (6), (7), (8) or (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) to the events F i[τ1,τ2], i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
and SR[τ1,τ2] defined in (27), (28) it is associated a probability that is evaluated
using statistical simulation. In fact the probability P(F i[τ1,τ2]) of the event F i[τ1,τ2], i =
1, 2, . . . , N, and the probability P(SR[τ1,τ2]) of the event SR[τ1,τ2] is approximated with
the corresponding frequencies computed on a set of numerically simulated trajectories
of the banking system model considered. Note that due to the homogeneity of the
bank population P(F i[τ1,τ2]) does not depend on i when i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
The loss distribution of the banks defaulted in the bounded time interval [τ1, τ2]
is the probability distribution of the random variable: number of bank defaults in the
time interval [τ1, τ2]. Given a banking system model the loss distribution of the banks
defaulted in the time interval [τ1, τ2] can be approximated using statistical simulation
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computing the distribution of the frequencies of the appropriate events in a set of
numerically simulated trajectories of the banking system model considered.
Let us study the loss distribution of the banks defaulted in the time interval
[0, T ], T = 1, in the banking system model (3), (5), (6), (7), (8) and in the banking
system model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8). In both models we choose N = 10, and
we evaluate the loss distribution of the banks defaulted in [0, T ], T = 1, using sta-
tistical simulation starting from 104 numerically simulated trajectories of the models
considered. Let us define the functions:
σ1,t = 0.8, t ∈ [0, 1], (29)
σ2,t =
{
0.2, t ∈ [0, 0.2],
1, t ∈ (0.2, 1], (30)
σ3,t =


0.2, t ∈ [0, 0.2],
0.8, t ∈ (0.2, 0.5],
0.2, t ∈ (0.5, 1].
(31)
In Figures 1-5 the dashed line shows the loss distribution of the banks defaulted in
the time interval [0, T ], T = 1, of model (3), (5), (6), (7), (8), while the solid line
shows the loss distribution of the banks defaulted in the time interval [0, T ], T = 1, of
model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) when in Figures 1-5 we have: N = 10, ϕt = 0.1,
φt = 0.06, σl = σl,t = 0.6, ρl = ρl,t = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, µa = 0.1, µl = 0.1; moreover
in Figure 1 we have: σa = σ1,t, ρa = ρa,t = 0, αt = 10, γt = 10, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, in
Figure 2 we have: σa = σ2,t, ρa = ρa,t = 0, αt = 20, γt = 20, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, in
Figure 3 we have: σa = σ3,t, ρa = ρa,t = 0, αt = 10, γt = 10, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, in
Figure 4 we have: σa = σ1,t, ρa = ρa,t = 0.5, αt = 10, γt = 10, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, and
finally in Figure 5 we have: σa = σ1,t, ρa = ρa,t =
√
0.5, αt = 10, γt = 10, t ∈ [0, T ],
T = 1.
Note that the results shown in Figures 1-5 are obtained when the functions
ϕt = 0.1, φt = 0.06, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, are constants. With this choice there is no
intervention of the monetary authority in the banking system dynamics for t ∈ (0, T ]
(in fact d ln(ϕt) = d ln(φt) = 0, t ∈ (0, T ], in (24), (25)) and only the cooperation
mechanism among banks is active when t ∈ [0, T ]. Note that in Figures 1-5 also the
functions αt, γt, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1, are chosen as constants.
For model (3), (5), (6), (7), (8) the loss distribution of the banks defaulted in
[0, T ], T = 1 (shown with a dashed line in Figures 1-5) is a unimodal distribution with
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a unique maximum corresponding to a maximizer (or to several adjacent maximizers)
located in the interior of the interval [0, N ], N = 10. Instead when we consider
model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) the loss distribution of the banks defaulted in
the time interval [0, T ], T = 1 (shown with a solid line in Figures 1-5) has a bump
near zero defaults and a bump near N defaults and is small in between, that is is a
bimodal distribution with two maxima corresponding to two maximizers (or to two
disjoint sets of adjacent maximizers) located at the endpoints of the interval [0, N ],
N = 10. This is due to the action of the cooperation mechanism among banks in
model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8). Moreover the comparison between Figure 1 and
Figures 4, 5 shows that the presence of a non zero correlation (i.e. ρa 6= 0, ρl = 0)
between the stochastic differentials on the right hand side of the assets equations of
the banks (Figures 4, 5) increases substantially the probability of “extreme” systemic
risk with respect to the probability of the same event in the zero correlation case (i.e.
ρa = ρl = 0) (Figure 1). Similar phenomena appear when volatility and correlation
coefficient jumps are present in the liabilities equations.
Figures 1-5 show that in a homogeneous bank population the cooperation among
banks introduced in model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) reduces the default probabil-
ity of the individual bank when compared to the default probability of the individual
bank in model (3), (5), (6), (7), (8) at the expenses of the default probability of the
entire (or of almost the entire) banking system that is greater in model (3), (11),
(24), (25), (26), (8) than in model (3), (5), (6), (7), (8). Moreover the comparison
of Figure 1 and Figures 4, 5 shows that this effect is enhanced by the presence of
“collective” behaviours in the bank population (i.e. is enhanced when ρ2a, ρ
2
l are
greater than zero). This is in agreement with the findings of [1], [3], [7], [10], where
it is shown that for the stability of a banking system an excessive homogeneity of the
bank population is undesirable.
4 The mean field approximation and the pseudo
mean field approximation
For a survey of the mean field approximation in the context of statistical mechanics,
see, for example, [5], and the references therein. We limit our attention to the use of
some ideas taken from the mean field approximation of statistical mechanics in the
study of the banking system models considered in the previous Sections.
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Let us begin considering the mean field approximation of the banking system
model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8). When the stochastic differentials of the equa-
tions (24), (25) dW it , dZ
i
t , t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , are independent, that is when in (8)
we have: ρ2a = ρ
2
a,t = 0, ρ
2
l = ρ
2
l,t = 0, t ≥ 0, so that in (9), (10) we have: dW it = dW˜ it ,
dZ it = dZ˜
i
t , t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , the mean field approximation of the banking sys-
tem model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) can be deduced proceeding as done in [4],
[3]. In fact when ρ2a = ρ
2
a,t = 0, ρ
2
l = ρ
2
l,t = 0, t ≥ 0, and N goes to infinity, it is easy
to see that the mean field limit of (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) is given by:
Yt = At − Lt, t ≥ 0, (32)
where
At = eGt , Lt = eHt , t ≥ 0, (33)
and Gt, Ht, t ≥ 0, satisfy the stochastic differential equations:
d (Gt − ln(ϕt)) = αt (ln(ϕt)− Gt) dt+ σadPt, t > 0, (34)
d (Ht − ln(φt)) = γt (ln(φt)−Ht) dt+ σldQt, t > 0, (35)
with the initial conditions:
G0 = ln(ϕ0), H0 = ln(φ0). (36)
The stochastic processes Pt, Qt, t ≥ 0, of (34), (35) are standard Wiener processes
such that P0 = 0, Q0 = 0, dPt, dQt, t > 0, are their stochastic differentials and we
have:
E(dPtdQt) = 0, t > 0. (37)
In the mean field approximation (32), (33), (34), (35), (36), (37) the stochastic
process Yt, t > 0, represents the capital reserves of the “mean bank” at time t ≥ 0.
Similarly the stochastic processes At, Lt, t > 0, represent, respectively, the assets
and the liabilities of the “mean bank” at time t ≥ 0. Due to the homogeneity of the
bank population, when N goes to infinity the assets, the liabilities and the capital
reserves of the banks of model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) behave, respectively, like
the assets, the liabilities and the capital reserves of the “mean bank”, that is behave
like the stochastic processes defined in (33), (32).
Let us consider the banking system model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) when
the stochastic differentials of equations (24), (25) are correlated, that is when ρa,
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ρl are non zero constants. Also in this case it is not difficult to deduce the mean
field approximation of the banking system model (see, for example, [1]), however,
for later convenience, we prefer to introduce a heuristic approximation of model (3),
(11), (24), (25), (26), (8) in the limit N goes to infinity that we call pseudo mean
field approximation that will be used in Sections 5 and 6 to govern the probability of
systemic risk in a bounded time interval. In the pseudo mean field approximation of
the banking system model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) the equations (34), (35) are
substituted, respectively, with the equations:
d (Gt − ln(ϕt)) = αt (1− |ρa|) (ln(ϕt)− Gt) dt+
gt |ρa| (ln(φt)−Ht) dt+ σadPt, t > 0, (38)
d (Ht − ln(φt)) = γt (1− |ρl|) (ln(φt)−Ht) dt+
ht |ρl| (ln(ϕt)− Gt) dt+ σldQt, t > 0. (39)
The equations (38), (39) are equipped with the initial conditions (36) and the as-
sumption (37). The functions gt ≥ 0, ht ≥ 0, t ≥ 0, are non negative functions
that will be chosen later. The pseudo mean field approximation is completed adding
the equations (32), (33) to the equations (38), (39), (36), (37). In the pseudo mean
field approximation (32), (33), (38), (39), (36), (37) the stochastic processes Yt, At,
Lt, t ≥ 0, have the same meaning than in the mean field approximation, that is
they represent, respectively, the capital reserves, the assets and the liabilities of the
“pseudo mean bank” as functions of time. The equations (32), (33), (38), (39), (36),
(37) define the dynamics of the “pseudo mean bank”.
When N goes to infinity and the functions gt, ht, t ≥ 0, are chosen appropri-
ately, the “pseudo mean bank” behaviour “approximates” the behaviour of the “mean
bank” and as a consequence “approximates” the behaviour of the banks of model (3),
(11), (24), (25), (26), (8). The choice of (32), (33), (38), (39), (36), (37) and in par-
ticular the choice of (38), (39) as pseudo mean field approximation is motivated by
the following facts. First of all when the stochastic differentials dW it , dZ
i
t , t > 0,
i = 1, 2, . . . , N , of equations (24), (25) are independent, that is when in (8) we have
ρ2a = 0, ρ
2
l = 0, t > 0, the pseudo mean field approximation (32), (33), (38), (39),
(36), (37) coincides with the mean field approximation (32), (33), (34), (35), (36),
(37). Moreover when in the equations (24), (25) the stochastic differentials dW it ,
t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and dZ it , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , are totally correlated, that is
when we have |ρa| = 1, |ρl| = 1, and we choose gt = 0, ht = 0, t > 0, the pseudo
mean field approximation (32), (33), (38), (39), (36), (37) “coincides” with the bank-
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ing system model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8), with |ρa| = 1, |ρl| = 1, t > 0. That
is the pseudo mean field approximation is “exact”. In fact when |ρa| = 1, |ρl| = 1,
t > 0, the initial conditions Gi0 = ln(ϕ0), H
i
0 = ln(φ0), i = 1, 2, . . . , N , imply that
the cooperation mechanism among banks present in (24) and in (25) has no influence
on the banking system dynamics. In fact the previous choices imply that in (24)
αt, t ≥ 0, multiplies the null term, that is imply that
N∑
j=1
(
Gjt −Git
)
dt = 0, t > 0.
Similarly the previous choices imply that in (25) γt, t ≥ 0, multiplies the null term,
that is imply that
N∑
j=1
(
Hjt −H it
)
dt = 0, t > 0. In fact when |ρa| = 1, |ρl| = 1, t > 0,
and Gi0 = ln(ϕ0), H
i
0 = ln(φ0), i = 1, 2, . . . , N , all the banks of the model satisfy the
same equation and can be considered as a “unique” bank repeated N times. Note
that the condition |ρa| = 1, |ρl| = 1, t > 0, implies that the Wiener processes present
in the equations relative to the different banks of the model coincide, that is dW it ,
dZ it , t > 0, in (24), (25) do not depend on i, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . In this case all the
banks of the banking system model are replicated exactly by the pseudo mean field
approximation (32), (33), (38), (39), (36), (37) when |ρa| = 1, |ρl| = 1, t > 0, and
we choose gt = 0, ht = 0, t > 0. When in the equations (24), (25) the stochastic
differentials dW it , dZ
i
t , t > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , are partially correlated, that is when in
(8) we have 0 < |ρa| < 1, 0 < |ρl| < 1, t > 0, choosing appropriately the functions
gt, ht, t > 0, the pseudo mean field approximation (32), (33), (38), (39), (36), (37)
“interpolates” between the extreme cases ρa = 0, ρl = 0, t > 0, and |ρa| = 1, |ρl| = 1,
t > 0. Finally in Section 6 in the systemic risk governance the form chosen for the
equations (38), (39) will make possible the use of the polynomial identity principle
to determine the functions αt, γt, t ≥ 0, that regulate the cooperation mechanism
among banks.
In Section 6 we explain the choice of the functions ϕt, φt, αt, γt, gt, ht, t ≥ 0,
that is used to govern the systemic risk probability in a bounded time interval of
model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8).
Note that when αt = 0, γt = 0, t ≥ 0, and the functions ϕt, φt, t ≥ 0, are positive
constants, there is no cooperation among banks and no intervention of the monetary
authority in the banking system dynamics. In this case in the pseudo mean field
approximation we choose gt = 0, ht = 0, t ≥ 0.
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5 An optimal control problem for the pseudo mean
field approximation
Let us consider an optimal control problem for the pseudo mean field approximation
(32), (33), (38), (39), (36), (37) of the banking system model (3), (11), (24), (25),
(26), (8) when 0 ≤ |ρa| < 1, 0 ≤ |ρl| < 1, t > 0. Let n be a positive integer, R be the
set of real numbers, Rn be the n-dimensional real Euclidean space and R+ be the set
of the positive real numbers.
Given the positive functions ϕt, φt, t ≥ 0, we define:
Zt = Gt − ln(ϕt), t ≥ 0, (40)
and
St = Ht − ln(φt), t ≥ 0, (41)
equations (38), (39), (36) can be rewritten as follows:
dZt = βa(t,Zt,St)dt+ σadPt, t > 0, (42)
dSt = βl(t,Zt,St)dt+ σldQt, t > 0, (43)
Z0 = 0, S0 = 0, (44)
where βa : R
+ × R2 → R and βl : R+ × R2 → R are given by:
βa = βa,t = βa(t,Z,S) = −αt (1− |ρa|)Z − |ρa| gt S, (Z,S) ∈ R2, t > 0, (45)
βl = βl,t = βl(t,Z,S) = −γt (1− |ρl|)S − |ρl| htZ, (Z,S) ∈ R2, t > 0, (46)
and in (44) the symbol 0 denotes the random variable concentrated in zero with
probability one.
To choose the functions αt, γt, gt, ht, t > 0, of (45), (46) as done in the systemic
risk governance of Section 6 we begin solving the stochastic optimal control problem
that follows.
Let T1 > 0 be a real number, λ = (λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4) ∈ R4, λi > 0, i = 1, 2, 3, 4,
and B be the set of the real square integrable stochastic processes defined in [0, T1],
that is a real stochastic process ζ = ζt, t ∈ [0, T1], belongs to B if and only if
E
(∫ T1
0
ζ2t dt
)
< +∞. We consider the following stochastic optimal control problem:
min
β1,β2∈B
Uλ(β1, β2), (47)
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where
Uλ(β1, β2) =
E
(∫ T1
0
[|ρaρl|(Zt − St)2 + λ1β21,t + λ2β22,t + λ3(1− |ρa|)Z2t + λ4(1− |ρl|)S2t ] dt
)
,
β1, β2 ∈ B, 0 ≤ |ρa| < 1, 0 ≤ |ρl| < 1, (48)
subject to
dZt = β1 dt+ σadPt, t ∈ [0, T1], (49)
dSt = β2 dt+ σldQt, t ∈ [0, T1], (50)
Z0 = 0, S0 = 0. (51)
In the control problem (47), (48), (49), (50), (51) the function Uλ(β1, β2) is the utility
function, β1 = β1,t = β1(t,Zt,St), β2 = β2,t = β2(t,Zt,St), t ∈ [0, T1], are the control
variables and Zt, St, t ∈ [0, T1], are the state variables. The random variables on
the right hand side of equation (51) must be interpreted as already done for those of
equation (44).
When 0 < |ρa| < 1, 0 < |ρl| < 1, minimizing the utility function Uλ(β1, β2),
β1 = β1,t, β2 = β2,t, t ∈ [0, T1], defined in (48) means making small in the time
interval [0, T1] the following quantities: i) the difference between the capital reserves
of the “pseudo mean bank” and the capital reserves of the “ideal bank” Zt − St =
(Gt − ln(ϕt)) − (Ht − ln(φt)), t ∈ [0, T1], ii) the “size” of the control variable β1,t,
t ∈ [0, T1], iii) the “size” of the control variable β2,t, t ∈ [0, T1], iv) the “size” of Zt,
t ∈ [0, T1] (and therefore the difference between Gt, t ∈ [0, T1], and the function ln(ϕt),
t ∈ [0, T1]), v) the “size” of St, t ∈ [0, T1] (and therefore the difference between Ht, t ∈
[0, T1], and the function ln(φt), t ∈ [0, T1]). These five goals correspond, respectively,
to making small the addenda: i) E
(∫ T1
0
|ρaρl|(Zt − St)2dt
)
, ii) E
(∫ T1
0
λ1β
2
1,t dt
)
,
iii) E
(∫ T1
0
λ2β
2
2,t dt
)
, iv) E
(∫ T1
0
λ3(1− |ρa|)Z2t dt
)
, v) E
(∫ T1
0
λ4(1− |ρl|) S2t dt)
of the utility function Uλ defined in (48).
Note that when ρa = 0 and/or ρl = 0 the term E
(∫ T1
0
|ρaρl|(Zt − St)2dt
)
of
Uλ is zero and that in this case minimizing the utility function Uλ corresponds to
pursuing only four of the five goals listed above, that is corresponds to pursuing the
goals of making small in the time interval [0, T1] the quantities ii), iii), iv), v).
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The control problem (47), (48), (49), (50), (51) is a linear-quadratic optimal
control problem (see [9]). Following Kalman [9] we assume that its value function
is a quadratic form in the real variables Z, S with time dependent coefficients. We
have:
Proposition 1. Under the previous assumptions when 0 ≤ |ρa| < 1 and 0 ≤ |ρl| < 1
the optimal control β1 = β1,t, β2 = β2,t, t ∈ [0, T1], solution of problem (47), (48),
(49), (50), (51) is given by:
β1 = β1,t = β1(t,Zt,St) = − 1
2λ1
(2a(t)Zt + c(t)St) , t ∈ [0, T1], (52)
β2 = β1,t = β2(t,Zt,St) = − 1
2λ2
(2b(t)St + c(t)Zt) , t ∈ [0, T1], (53)
where Zt, St, t ∈ [0, T1], are solution of the initial value problem (49), (50), (51).
The functions a(t), b(t), c(t), d(t), t ∈ [0, T1], are defined by the following final value
problem:
∂a
∂t
=
a2
λ1
+
c2
4λ2
− |ρaρl| − λ3(1− |ρa|), t ∈ [0, T1], a(T1) = 0, (54)
∂b
∂t
=
b2
λ2
+
c2
4λ1
− |ρaρl| − λ4(1− |ρl|), t ∈ [0, T1], b(T1) = 0, (55)
∂c
∂t
=
ac
λ1
+
bc
λ2
+ 2|ρaρl|, t ∈ [0, T1], c(T1) = 0, (56)
∂d
∂t
= −aσ2a − bσ2l , t ∈ [0, T1], d(T1) = 0. (57)
Note that the optimal control (52), (53) does not depend from the function d(t),
t ∈ [0, T1] that appears in (57); it depends only from the functions a(t), b(t), c(t),
t ∈ [0, T1], and that the final value problem (54), (55), (56) satisfied by a(t), b(t), c(t),
t ∈ [0, T1], can be solved independently from the final value problem (57) satisfied
by d(t), t ∈ [0, T1]. However the function d(t), t ∈ [0, T1] is necessary to define the
value function V (see (63)) of the control problem (47), (48), (49), (50), (51) and the
formulae (52), (53) for the optimal control are deduced from the expression of the
value function.
Proof. Let us use the dynamic programming principle (see [9]) to solve the control
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problem (47), (48), (49), (50), (51). That is let
V (t,Z,S) = min
β1,β2∈B
E
(∫ T1
t
[|ρaρl|(Zτ − Sτ )2 + λ1β21,τ + λ2β22,τ + λ3(1− |ρa|)Z2τ+
λ4(1− |ρl|)S2τ
]
dτ
∣∣∣Zt = Z,St = S) , (Z,S) ∈ R2, t ∈ [0, T1], (58)
be the value function of the control problem (47), (48), (49), (50), (51). The function
V (t,Z,S), (Z,S) ∈ R2, t ∈ [0, T1], satisfies the following Hamilton, Jacobi, Bellman
equation (see [9]):
∂
∂t
V (t,Z,S) + 1
2
σ2a
∂2
∂Z2V (t,Z,S) +
1
2
σ2l
∂2
∂S2V (t,Z,S) + |ρaρl| (Z − S)
2 +
λ3(1− |ρa|)Z2 + λ4(1− |ρl|)S2 +H
(
∂
∂Z V (t,Z,S),
∂
∂S V (t,Z,S)
)
= 0,
(Z,S) ∈ R2, t ∈ [0, T1], (59)
with final condition:
V (T1,Z,S) = 0, (Z,S) ∈ R2, (60)
where
H(p1, p2) = min
(δ1,δ2)∈R2
(
δ1p1 + λ1δ
2
1 + δ2p2 + λ2δ
2
2
)
= − p
2
1
4λ1
− p
2
2
4λ2
, (p1, p2) ∈ R2, (61)
is the Hamiltonian function of the optimal control problem (47), (48), (49), (50),
(51).
Using (61) equation (59) becomes:
∂
∂t
V (t,Z,S) + 1
2
σ2a
∂2
∂Z2V (t,Z,S) +
1
2
σ2l
∂2
∂S2V (t,Z,S) + |ρaρl| (Z − S)
2 +
λ3(1− |ρa|)Z2 + λ4(1− |ρl|)S2 − 1
4λ1
(
∂
∂Z V (t,Z,S)
)2
−
1
4λ2
(
∂
∂S V (t,Z,S)
)2
= 0, (Z,S) ∈ R2, t ∈ [0, T1], (62)
with the final condition (60).
Following Kalman [9] we assume that the value function solution of problem (62),
(60) is of the form:
V (t,Z,S) = a(t)Z2 + b(t)S2 + c(t)ZS + d(t), (Z,S) ∈ R2, t ∈ [0, T1], (63)
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where a(t), b(t), c(t), d(t), t ∈ [0, T1], are functions to be determined.
Substituting (63) in (62), (60) and using the polynomial identity principle it is easy
to see that the final value problem for the Hamilton, Jacobi, Bellman equation (62),
(60) reduces to the final value problem (54), (55), (56), (57).
Problem (54), (55), (56), (57) is a final value problem for a system of Riccati
ordinary differential equations. In general systems of this kind have only local solu-
tions. This means that, in general, a solution of (54), (55), (56), (57) in the time
interval [0, T1] may not exist. When this is the case the assumption (63) about the
form of the value function is not good enough to solve problem (47), (48), (49), (50),
(51) and we do not go any further in the study of the control problem (47), (48),
(49), (50), (51). From now on we assume that the final value problem (54), (55),
(56), (57) has a solution defined in [0, T1].
From the knowledge of the value function V defined in (63) solution of (62), (60)
the optimal control β1 = β1,t, β2 = β2,t, t ∈ [0, T1], solution of (47), (48), (49), (50),
(51) is determined using the formulae:
β1 = β1,t = β1(t,Zt,St) = − 1
2λ1
∂
∂Z V (t,Z,S)
∣∣∣
Z=Zt,S=St
= − 1
2λ1
(2a(t)Zt + c(t)St) ,
t ∈ [0, T1], (64)
β2 = β2,t = β2(t,Zt,St) = − 1
2λ2
∂
∂S V (t,Z,S)
∣∣∣
Z=Zt,S=St
= − 1
2λ2
(2b(t)St + c(t)Zt) ,
t ∈ [0, T1], (65)
where Zt, St, t ∈ [0, T1], are the solution of (49), (50), (51) when β1=β1,t, β2=β2,t,
t ∈ [0, T1], are given by (64), (65).
Problem (47), (48), (49), (50), (51) is the optimal control problem used to govern
the pseudo mean field approximation (32), (33), (38), (39), (36), (37) of the banking
system model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8). In fact, when 0 ≤ |ρa| < 1, 0 ≤ |ρl| < 1,
given the optimal control β1, β2 defined in (64), (65) we determine the functions
βa, βl of (45), (46) imposing the identities βa(Z,S) = β1(Z,S), βl(Z,S) = β2(Z,S),
(Z,S) ∈ R2, and using the polynomial identity principle in the variables (Z,S) ∈ R2.
We have:
αt =
a(t)
λ1(1− |ρa|) , γt =
b(t)
λ2(1− |ρl|) , t ∈ [0, T1], 0 ≤ |ρa|, |ρl| < 1, (66)
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and
gt =
c(t)
2λ1 |ρa| , ht =
c(t)
2λ2 |ρl| , t ∈ [0, T1], 0 < |ρa|, |ρl| < 1, (67)
or
ht = 0 and/or gt = 0, t ∈ [0, T1], ρa = 0 and/or ρl = 0. (68)
Let us point out that when ρa = 0 and/or ρl = 0 the function c(t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T1] is
a solution of (56). Moreover note that the use of the polynomial identity principle
in the deduction of (66), (67), (68) is possible thanks to the form of equations (38),
(39) of the pseudo mean field approximation.
Recall that the function αt, t ∈ [0, T1], defined in (66) is a function that substi-
tuted in (24) induces the trajectories of the logarithm of the assets to swarm around
ln(ϕt), t ∈ [0, T1], and therefore induces the trajectories of the assets to swarm around
ϕt, t ∈ [0, T1]. Similarly the function γt, t ∈ [0, T1], defined in (66) is a function that
substituted in (25) induces the trajectories of the logarithms of the liabilities to swarm
around ln(φt), t ∈ [0, T1], and therefore induces the trajectories of the liabilities to
swarm around φt, t ∈ [0, T1].
Remember that in (24), (25) the constraints αt ≥ 0, γt ≥ 0, t ∈ [0, T1], must
be satisfied. When they are not satisfied by the choices of αt, γt, t ∈ [0, T1], made
in (66) they are enforced. In the numerical experiments discussed in Section 6 when
the functions αt and/or γt, t ∈ [0, T1], determined using (66) are negative, we choose
αt = 0 and/or γt = 0, t ∈ [0, T1].
Note that the formulae (66), (67), (68) provide a choice of the functions αt, γt,
gt, ht when t ∈ [0, T1]; to choose the functions αt, γt, gt, ht when t > 0 the previous
formulae must be adapted to take care of the repeated solution of control problems
similar to the one considered here.
6 The systemic risk governance
Let T2 > 0 be a real number and consider the problem of governing the probability
of systemic risk in the time interval [0, T2] in model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) in
absence or in presence of shocks acting on the banking system. Given τ1, τ2 such that
0 ≤ τ1 < τ2 ≤ T2, and the interval [τ1, τ2] ⊆ [0, T2], let us consider the governance of
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systemic risk in the time interval [τ1, τ2]. The goal of the governance is to keep the
probability of systemic risk in the time interval [τ1, τ2], P(SR[τ1,τ2]), between two given
thresholds. The systemic risk governance pursues its goal trying to keep the assets,
the liabilities and the capital reserves of the banks of the model “close”, respectively,
to the assets, the liabilities and the capital reserves of the “ideal bank”, that is close,
respectively, to the functions ϕt > 0, φt > 0 and ξt = ϕt − φt > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2].
Given the choice of the functions ϕt, φt, ξt = ϕt − φt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], the governance is
based on the solution of the optimal control problem (47), (48), (49), (50), (51) and
on its relation with the banking system model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) when
the functions αt, γt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], are chosen adapting formula (66) deduced for the
time interval [0, T1] to the time interval [τ1, τ2]. In fact the choice of the functions
αt, γt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], obtained adapting formula (66) to the time interval [τ1, τ2], creates
a “swarming” effect of the assets and of the liabilities of the banks of the model
around, respectively, the functions ϕt, φt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], and, as a consequence, creates
a “swarming” effect of the capital reserves of the banks of the model around the
function ξt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2].
We assume that the decisions about systemic risk governance in the time interval
[τ1, τ2] are taken at time t = τ1. Going into details to pursue the goal of keeping the
probability of systemic risk in the time interval [τ1, τ2], P(SR[τ1,τ2]), between two given
thresholds the first thing to do at time t = τ1 is to choose appropriately the functions
ϕt, φt, ξt = ϕt − φt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2]. In fact it is easy to see that increasing ξt > 0,
t ∈ [τ1, τ2], the systemic risk probability in [τ1, τ2] decreases and that decreasing
ξt > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], the systemic risk probability in [τ1, τ2] increases. Moreover, since
ξt = ϕt − φt > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], increasing ξt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], can be done increasing ϕt
leaving unchanged φt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], or decreasing φt leaving unchanged ϕt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2],
or changing at the same time ϕt and φt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2]. Similarly decreasing ξt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2],
can be done either decreasing ϕt leaving unchanged φt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], or increasing φt
leaving unchanged ϕt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], or changing at the same time ϕt and φt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2].
Given the thresholds S1, S2, such that 0 < S1 < S2 < 1, and ϕτ1, φτ1 , ξτ1 =
ϕτ1 − φτ1 we want to choose the functions ϕt, φt, ξt = ϕt − φt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], such
that the probability of systemic risk in the time interval [τ1, τ2] satisfies the following
inequalities:
S1 ≤ P(SR[τ1,τ2]) ≤ S2. (69)
We define some simple rules that are used to choose the functions ϕt, φt, ξt =
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ϕt − φt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2] in order to satisfy (69). At time t = τ1 we start making the
“simplest” possible choice of ϕt, φt, ξt = ϕt − φt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], that is we choose:
ϕt = ϕτ1 , φt = φτ1 , ξt = ξτ1 , t ∈ [τ1, τ2]. In correspondence to this choice the
functions αt, γt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], are determined adapting formula (66) to the time interval
[τ1, τ2] and the probability of systemic risk in the time interval [τ1, τ2], P(SR[τ1,τ2]), is
evaluated using statistical simulation. Note that P(SR[τ1,τ2]) depends not only from
the functions ϕt, φt, αt, γt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], but also from the random variables aiτ1 , liτ1 ,
ciτ1 = a
i
τ1
−liτ1 , i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Based on the value of P(SR[τ1,τ2]) the following actions
are taken:
Strategy 1: if P(SR[τ1,τ2]) > S2 the monetary authority changes the functions
ϕt, φt, ξt = ϕt − φt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], to “swarm” the trajectories of the capital
reserves of the banking system model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) “upward”,
that is the monetary authority increases ξt > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2]. This is done in one
of the following ways:
Strategy 1a: increasing ϕt > 0 leaving unchanged φt > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2];
Strategy 1b: decreasing φt > 0 leaving unchanged ϕt > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2];
Strategy 1c: changing both ϕt > 0 and φt > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2].
Strategy 2: if P(SR[τ1,τ2]) < S1 the monetary authority changes the functions
ϕt, φt, ξt = ϕt−φt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], to “swarm” the trajectories of the capital reserves
of the banking system model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) “downward”, that
is the monetary authority decreases ξt > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2]. This is done in one of
the following ways:
Strategy 2a: decreasing ϕt > 0 leaving unchanged φt > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2];
Strategy 2b: increasing φt > 0 leaving unchanged ϕt > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2];
Strategy 2c: changing both ϕt > 0 and φt > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2].
Strategy 3: if S1 ≤ P(SR[τ1,τ2]) ≤ S2 the monetary authority leaves the functions
ϕt, φt, ξt = ϕt − φt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], unchanged.
Note that at time t = τ1 the monetary authority makes its decisions about
systemic risk governance in the time interval [τ1, τ2] assuming that the volatilities σa,
σl and the correlation coefficients ρ
2
a, ρ
2
l in the time interval [τ1, τ2] remain constant
at the value that they have at time t = τ1. That is the monetary authority does not
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foresee volatility and/or correlation shocks that hit the banking system in the time
interval [τ1, τ2], simply reacts to them after they have occurred.
The choice of acting on the assets ϕt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], or on the liabilities φt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2],
of the “ideal bank”, depends from the kind of shock that must be confronted. For
example in presence of a volatility shock on the side of the assets occurred before
t = τ1 (the systemic risk governance decision time), that is reacting to a jump of the
function σa occurred before t = τ1, it is natural at time t = τ1 to increase/decrease
ξt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], simply increasing/decreasing ϕt > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], leaving unchanged
φt > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2]. In other words in this situation it is natural to limit the actions
considered by the monetary authority to Strategy 1a, 2a and 3. Similarly in presence
of a volatility shock on the side of the liabilities occurred before t = τ1, that is reacting
to the presence of a jump of the function σl occurred before t = τ1, it is natural at time
t = τ1 to increase/to decrease ξt, t ∈ [τ1, τ2], simply decreasing/increasing φt > 0,
t ∈ [τ1, τ2], leaving unchanged ϕt > 0, t ∈ [τ1, τ2]. That is in this situation it is
natural to limit the actions considered by the monetary authority to Strategy 1b, 2b
and 3.
When possible the strategy of increasing the assets of the “ideal bank” is more
desirable for the well being of the economy than the strategy of decreasing the lia-
bilities of the “ideal bank”. In fact increasing the assets induces a similar behaviour
of the assets of the banks of the banking system and this keeps the wheels of the
economy turning, while decreasing the liabilities induces a similar behaviour of the
liabilities of the banks of the banking system and has the effect of slowing down the
economy. Taking it to extremes, when possible, the monetary authority should prefer
Strategies 1a, 2b and 3 to Strategies 1b, 1c, 2a, 2c
The choice between the Strategies 1a, 1b, 1c, or 2a, 2b, 2c, is based on the com-
parison of these strategies from the systemic risk point of view. A possible criterion
to compare Strategies 1a, 1b, 1c, or 2a, 2b, 2c from the systemic risk point of view
is to evaluate the corresponding loss distributions of the banks defaulted in the time
interval [τ1, τ2]. The strategy associated to the loss distribution with the “smallest
tail” must be considered as the best strategy. For simplicity we do not pursue this
goal here.
Let us discuss some numerical experiments of systemic risk governance. That
is let us present the results obtained considering the governance of systemic risk in
the next year during a period of two years in model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) in
absence or in presence of shocks acting on the banking system. Governance decisions
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are taken at the beginning of each quarter during the two years period studied. For
the sake of simplicity we consider only the following types of shocks: volatility shocks
on the side of the assets and volatility shocks on the side of the liabilities. The
occurrence of these shocks is simulated respectively with jumps of the volatilities σa,
σl, of the stochastic differential equations of the assets (24) and of the liabilities (25).
Note that together with jumps in the volatility coefficients sometime we consider
jumps in the correlation coefficients ρa, ρl, of the stochastic differentials on the right
hand side of equations (24), (25). Moreover when there are no shocks acting on the
banking system or when the monetary authority faces a volatility shock on the side of
the assets of the banks we consider as possible only the actions described in Strategy
1a, 2a, 3 and in Strategy 1a, 2b, 3. Similarly when the monetary authority faces a
volatility shock on the side of the liabilities of the banks we consider as possible only
the actions described in Strategy 1a, 2b, 3 and in Strategy 1b, 2b, 3.
In the experiments we study a banking system model with N = 10 banks with
a time horizon T2 of three years, that is we choose the time unit equal to one year
and T2 = 3. We suppose that governance decisions are taken quarterly, that is the
time step of the governance decisions is ∆τ = 1/4. In the time interval [0, T2] we
consider the time intervals [τ j1 , τ
j
2 ] ⊂ [0, T2], T2 = 3, where τ j1 = j ·∆τ and τ j2 = τ j1 +1,
j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, and governance decisions are taken at the times t = τ j1 , j = 0, 1, . . . , 8.
That is at time t = τ j1 it is taken the decision relative to systemic risk in the time
interval [τ j1 , τ
j
2 ], at time t = τ
j
1 this is the systemic risk in the next year, j = 0, 1, . . . , 8.
In the time intervals [τ j1 , τ
j
2 ], j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, the model (3), (11), (24), (25), (26),
(8) reduces to the following (sub)-models:
cit = a
i
t − lit, t ∈ [τ j1 , τ j2 ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N, j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, (70)
where the stochastic processes:
Git = ln(a
i
t), H
i
t = ln(l
i
t), t ∈ [τ j1 , τ j2 ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N, j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, (71)
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satisfy the following system of stochastic differential equations:
dGit =
αt
N
N∑
k=1
(
Gkt −Git
)
dt+ d ln(ϕt) + σadW
i
t ,
t ∈ (τ j1 , τ j2 ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N, j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, (72)
dH it =
γt
N
N∑
k=1
(
Hkt −H it
)
dt+ d ln(φt) + σldZ
i
t ,
t ∈ (τ j1 , τ j2 ], i = 1, 2, . . . , N, j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, (73)
with the initial conditions:
Giτ0
1
= ln(a˜0), H
i
τ0
1
= ln(l˜0), i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (74)
Gi
τ
j
1
= Gi
τ
j−1
2
, H i
τ
j
1
= H i
τ
j−1
2
, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, j = 1, 2, . . . , 8, (75)
and the assumption:
E(dW it dW
k
t ) = ρ
2
a dt, i 6= k, E(dZ itdZkt ) = ρ2l dt, i 6= k,
E(dW it dW
i
t ) = E(dZ
k
t dZ
k
t ) = dt, E(dW
i
t dZ
k
t ) = 0,
t ∈ [τ j1 , τ j2 ], i, k = 1, 2, . . . , N, j = 0, 1, . . . , 8. (76)
For j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, the functions αt, γt, t ∈ [τ j1 , τ j2 ], in (72), (73) chosen are
obtained adapting formula (66) that is relative to the time interval [0, T1] to the
time interval [τ j1 , τ
j
2 ]. In each time interval [τ
j
1 , τ
j
2 ], j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, the probability
of systemic risk of the corresponding sub-model (70), (71), (72), (73), (74), (75),
(76) is evaluated using statistical simulation starting from 104 numerically generated
trajectories of the corresponding sub-model (70), (71), (72), (73), (74), (75), (76).
These trajectories are obtained by finite differences using the explicit Euler method
with time step ∆t = 10−4 to solve numerically the stochastic differential equations
(72), (73) with the auxiliary conditions (74), (75), (76).
In order to keep the probability of systemic risk in each time interval [τ j1 , τ
j
2 ], j =
0, 1, . . . , 8, between the thresholds S1 and S2, we provide to the monetary authority a
pre-defined set of functions that can be used to push the trajectories of the assets and
of the liabilities of the j-th sub-model (70), (71), (72), (73), (74), (75), (76) “upward”
or “downward”, or to leave them “unchanged”, j = 0, 1, . . . , 8. That is for the assets
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we define the functions:
Aj,na : ϕt = ϕt,j,na =


na
8
(t− τ j1 ) + ϕτ j
1
, t ∈ [τ j1 , τ j1 +∆τ ],
na
8
∆τ + ϕ
τ
j
1
, t ∈ (τ j1 +∆τ, τ j2 ],
j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, na = −8,−7, .., 0, .., 7, 8, (77)
similarly for the liabilities we define the functions:
Lj,nl : φt = φt,j,nl =


nl
8
(t− τ j1 ) + φτ j
1
, t ∈ [τ j1 , τ j1 +∆τ ],
nl
8
∆τ + φ
τ
j
1
, t ∈ (τ j1 +∆τ, τ j2 ],
j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, nl = −8,−7, .., 0, .., 7, 8, (78)
and finally based on (77), (78) for the capital reserves we define the functions:
Pj,na,nl : ξt = ξt,j,na,nl = ϕt,j,na − φt,j,nl, t ∈ [τ j1 , τ j2 ],
j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, na nl = −8,−7, .., 0, .., 7, 8. (79)
Note that for j = 0, 1, . . . , 8 in (77) when 0 < na ≤ 8 (respectively −8 ≤ na < 0)
the function ϕt,j,na, is a non decreasing (respectively non increasing) piecewise linear
function of t, while when na = 0 the function ϕt,j,na is a constant. Consequently
for j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, the choices of functions ϕt,j,na with 0 < na ≤ 8 (respectively
−8 ≤ na < 0) in (77) push the trajectories of the assets of the j-th sub-model
(70), (71), (72), (73), (74), (75), (76) “upward” (respectively “downward”), while the
choice na = 0 in (77) leaves the trajectories of the assets of the j-th sub-model (70),
(71), (72), (73), (74), (75), (76) “unchanged”. Similar statements adapted to the
circumstances hold for the choices 0 < nl ≤ 8, −8 ≤ nl < 0, nl = 0 of the functions
φt,j,nl in (78) and for the trajectories of the liabilities of the j-th sub-model (70), (71),
(72), (73), (74), (75), (76). Note that the implementation of Strategy 1, 2, 3 with the
choices made in (77), (78) is only illustrative, many other choices of the functions
representing the assets and the liabilities of the “ideal bank” are possible and lead to
results analogous to the ones discussed here.
To measure the quality and the cost of the systemic risk governance implemented
in the experiments we define four performance indices. Let
ηj = P(SR[τ j
1
,τ
j
2
]), j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, (80)
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and let η = (η0, η1, . . . , η8) ∈ R9 be the vector of the systemic risk governance pro-
cedure implemented in the experiments. The systemic risk norm NSR is defined as
follows:
NSR =
∥∥η∥∥
2
, (81)
where ‖η‖2 denotes the Euclidean norm of the vector η. The index NSR is used
to measure the quality of the systemic risk governance. Note that small values of
the index NSR correspond to high quality systemic risk governance and that in the
numerical experiments discussed here when the goal of the governance (69) is achieved
in every one year time interval contained in [0, T2] we have 3S1 ≤ NSR ≤ 3S2.
The indices CcSR, CαSR, CγSR are used to measure the cost of the systemic risk
governance. The first index CcSR measures the “cost associated to the choice of the
assets and of the liabilities” of the “ideal bank” defined in (77) and (78), while the
indices CαSR, CγSR measure “the cost associated to the choice of the functions αt, γt,
t ∈ [0, T2], that regulate the cooperation mechanism among banks. More specifically
in each one year period considered in the governance procedure we define as cost
associated to the choice of the assets and of the liabilities of the “ideal bank” the
absolute value of the angular coefficient of the linear part of the piecewise linear
functions listed in (77), (78). In this way in the period [τ j1 , τ
j
2 ] the cost of choosing
Aj,na, defined in (77), is
|na|
8
, na = −8,−7, .., 0, .., 7, 8, and similarly the cost of
choosing Lj,nl, defined in (78), is
|nl|
8
, nl = −8,−7, .., 0, .., 7, 8. Finally the cost of
choosing Pj,na,nl given in (79), is defined as
|na|
8
+
|nl|
8
, na = −8,−7, .., 0, .., 7, 8,
nl = −8,−7, .., 0, .., 7, 8. The total cost measured by the index CcSR of the systemic
risk governance procedure defined above is given by the sum over j of the cost of the
trajectories Pj,na,nl, j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, used in the procedure. The indices CαSR, CγSR are
given, respectively, by the sum of the means of αt, γt in the time intervals [τ
j
1 , τ
j
2 ],
j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, used in the systemic risk governance procedure, that is, recalling
equations (72), (73) and defining:
α¯j =
1
∆τ
∫ τ j
2
τ
j
1
αt dt, t ∈ [τ j1 , τ j2 ], j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, (82)
γ¯j =
1
∆τ
∫ τ j
2
τ
j
1
γt dt, , t ∈ [τ j1 , τ j2 ], j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, (83)
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we have:
CαSR =
8∑
j=0
α¯j, CγSR =
8∑
j=0
γ¯j . (84)
In the numerical experiments the indices NSR, CcSR, CαSR, CγSR change significantly
depending from the circumstances (i.e. presence or absence of volatility and correla-
tion shocks) faced during the two years period of the systemic risk governance proce-
dure. Moreover covering the entire history of the governance, that is covering a two
year governance period made of nine quarterly decisions, the indices defined above
measure only a “overall” quality and cost of the systemic risk governance procedure.
Table 1 shows the numerical results obtained in the systemic risk governance
of model (70), (71), (72), (73), (74), (75), (76). In the experiments presented the
monetary authority pursues the goal of keeping the probability of systemic risk in
the next year between the thresholds S1 = 0.01 and S2 = 0.05 implementing the
actions associated to Strategy 1, 2, 3 through the choice of the functions Aj,na, Lj,nl,
Pj,na,nl, j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, na = −8,−7, .., 0, .., 7, 8, nl = −8,−7, .., 0, .., 7, 8, defined
respectively in (77), (78), (79). More in detail, for j = 0, 1, . . . , 8, the monetary
authority runs through the possible choices of the functions listed in (77), (78), (79)
in their natural order according to Strategies 1, 2, 3 starting from the choice Aj,0,
Lj,0, Pj,0,0 = Aj,0 − Lj,0 and evaluates using statistical simulation the probability of
systemic risk in the next year associated to each choice of the previous functions
considered. The first choice encountered that gives a probability of systemic risk in
the next year that satisfies (69) is chosen as systemic risk governance decision. The
choice of the functions αt, γt corresponding to the previous choices of the functions
ϕt, φt, is done adapting (66) to the circumstances. If none of the functions listed in
(77), (78), (79) gives a probability of systemic risk in the next year that satisfies (69)
the governance procedure is not able to reach its goal in the time interval considered,
in this case the governance procedure takes the best choice available in (77), (78),
(79) and tries to reach its goal in the successive time interval.
Note that when the correlation coefficients ρ2a and/or ρ
2
l increase the “swarming”
effect induced by the cooperation mechanism among banks in (24) and/or (25) de-
creases. Recall that in the extreme case of ρ2a = 1, ρ
2
l = 1 the cooperation mechanism
has no effect anymore. Therefore when ρ2a = 1, ρ
2
l = 1 to govern the systemic risk
probability it is only possible is to increase the capital reserves of the “ideal bank”.
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Let σ4,t, t ∈ [0, T2], T2 = 3, be defined as follows:
σ4,t =


0.3, t ∈ [0, 0.2],
0.8, t ∈ (0.2, 0.5],
0.3, t ∈ (0.5, 3].
(85)
In the experiments of Table 1 to model positive shocks acting on the assets or on
the liabilities of the banks we consider the choices σa = σ4,t, t ∈ [0, T2], T2 = 3, or
σl = σ4,t, t ∈ [0, T2], T2 = 3. Moreover let ρ1,t, t ∈ [0, T2], T2 = 3, be defined as
follows:
ρ = ρ1,t =


0, t ∈ [0, 0.2],
0.5, t ∈ (0.2, 0.5],
0, t ∈ (0.5, 3].
(86)
The “collective” behaviour of the banks in presence of shocks is modeled assuming a
positive correlation in the noise terms of the assets or of the liabilities equations of
(70), (71), (72), (73), (74), (75), (76). In particular in some experiments we consider
the choices ρa = ρ1,t, t ∈ [0, T2], T2 = 3, or ρl = ρ1,t, t ∈ [0, T2], T2 = 3.
Note that the function σ4,t, t ∈ [0, T2], T2 = 3, defined in (85) and the function
ρ1,t, t ∈ [0, T2], T2 = 3, defined in (86) “jump together” at time t = 0.2 and t = 0.5.
The remaining parameters of the model used in the experiments reported in Table
1 are: µa = 0.1, µl = 0.1, a˜0 = ϕ0 = 0.6, l˜0 = φ0 = 0.4, λi = 0.1, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Note
that the previous choices guarantee ξt = ϕt − φt > 0, t ∈ [0, T2], T2 = 3.
Table 1 shows the values of the indices NSR, CcSR, CαSR, CγSR obtained in the
experiments. In the seventh column of Table 1, next to the value of NSR, it is shown,
within brackets, the value of NSR obtained in absence of governance. In absence of
governance we choose µa = 0.1, µl = 0.1, αt = 10, γt = 10, t ∈ [0, T2], T2 = 3,
a˜0 = ϕ0 = 0.6, l˜0 = φ0 = 0.4, and we evaluate the probability of systemic risk in the
next year at the beginning of each quarter. These choices of the parameter values
guarantee that the probability of systemic risk in the next year at time t = 0 is
between the thresholds S1 = 0.01 and S2 = 0.05. Note that with the previous choices
in absence of governance the values of the indices CcSR, CαSR, CγSR are always equal to,
respectively, 0, 90, 90. When necessary the values of the last three columns of Table
1 obtained in presence of governance may be compared with values of the indices
CcSR = 0, CαSR = 90, CγSR = 90 that correspond to the absence of governance.
A first overview of Table 1 shows that from the systemic risk governance point
of view the performance of Strategies 1a, 2a, 3 versus Strategies 1a, 2b, 3 and of
Strategies 1a, 2b, 3 versus Strategies 1b, 2b, 3 is approximately the same.
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Experiments 1 and 2 of Table 1 show that when the volatilities σa, σl are constants
and there are no correlation shocks in the time interval [0, T2], T2 = 3, the presence
or the absence of governance does not make a significant difference provided that,
in absence of governance at time t = 0, a good choice of the assets and of the
liabilities of the “ideal bank” in the one year period beginning at time t = 0 and
of the constant values of αt, γt, t ∈ [0, T2], T2 = 3, is done. That is, when the
volatilities σa, σl are constants and there are no correlation shocks in the time interval
[0, T2], T2 = 3, the systemic risk governance is substantially reduced to the choice
of the assets and of the liabilities of the “ideal bank” at the beginning of the time
interval considered for the governance experiment, that is at time t = 0 and of the
constant values of the functions αt, γt, t ∈ [0, T2], T2 = 3. When this choice is done
correctly continuing with assets and liabilities functions of the “ideal bank” constants
or with small variations of it in each successive time interval [τ j1 , τ
j
2 ], j = 1, 2, . . . , 8, is
sufficient to keep the probability of systemic risk in the next year between the given
thresholds. The functions αt, γt, t ∈ [0, T2], T2 = 3, is done according to the rules
established in Section 5 in the study of the control problem for the pseudo mean field
approximation of the banking system. In this case the possibly positive value of CcSR
in presence of governance (compared with CcSR = 0 of the absence of governance)
is certainly compensated by the smaller values of the indices CαSR, CγSR with respect
to the values corresponding to the absence of governance (i.e. CαSR=90, CγSR = 90).
Moreover note that in these cases we have 3S1 ≤ NSR ≤ 3S2.
Note that in Experiment 1 the choice of the functions αt = 10, γt = 10, t ∈
[0, T2], T2 = 3, made in absence of governance together with the choices of the other
parameters of the problem guarantees that the probability of systemic risk in the next
year at time t = 0 is between the thresholds S1 = 0.01 and S2 = 0.05 and gives values
of NSR in presence and in absence of governance of the same order of magnitude. To
have an idea of the consequences of changing the values αt = 10, γt = 10, t ∈ [0, T2],
T2 = 3, let us mention that if in Experiments 1 we fix αt = 1, γt = 1, t ∈ [0, T2],
T2 = 3, leaving all the remaining parameters unchanged, in absence of governance we
have CcSR = 0, CαSR = 9, CγSR = 9, but we have NSR = 0.30.
As expected the comparison between Experiments 1 and 3 of Table 1 shows that
the governance of the systemic risk in presence of volatility shocks is more demanding
than the governance in absence of shocks. This can be seen comparing the cost indices
CcSR, CαSR, CγSR and the quality index NSR of Experiment 1 and 3. Furthermore things
become worse when together with a volatility shock also a correlation shock acts on
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the liabilities equations of the banking system. This last fact can be seen comparing
the performance indices of Experiments 1, 3 and 4 of Table 1. In particular the
comparison of the performance indices of Experiments 3 and 4 shows that the values
of the cost indices CcSR, CαSR, CγSR increase significantly going from Experiment 3 to
Experiment 4 despite the fact that the index NSR signals that the quality of the
governance is decreasing. In fact in Experiment 3 and 4 we have NSR > 3S2, this
means that during the two year period studied has not been always possible to satisfy
(69). Note that the index NSR in Experiment 4 is greater than in Experiment 3, this
shows that the “collective” behaviour of the banks induced by the non zero correlation
ρa makes the governance more difficult.
Similar observations can be made when a volatility shocks acts on the liabilities of
the banks (compare, for example, Experiments 1 and 5 of Table 1) and when positive
correlation is present in the noise terms of the liabilities equations ρl (compare, for
example, Experiments 5 and 6).
Moreover note that in Experiments 3, 4, 5, 6 the values of the index NSR is
always greater than 3S2 = 0.15. This is due to the fact that when the governance
faces the shock for the first time it is unable to reach its goal of having the probability
of systemic risk in the next year inside the assigned thresholds.
We conclude that in the Experiments presented in Table 1 the systemic risk
governance procedure proposed is able to reach its goal, that is is able to keep the
probability of systemic risk in the next year between the assigned thresholds at a
reasonable cost.
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Figure 1: Loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) when
N = 10, µa = 0.1, µl = 0.1, σa = σ1,t, σl = 0.6, ρa = 0, ρl = 0, ϕt = 0.1, φt = 0.06, αt = 10,
γt = 10, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1 (solid line) and loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (3),
(5), (6), (7) when N = 10, µa = 0.1, µl = 0.1, σa = σ1,t, σl = 0.6, ρa = 0, ρl = 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
T = 1 (dashed line).
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Figure 2: Loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) when
N = 10, µa = 0.1, µl = 0.1, σa = σ2,t, σl = 0.6, ρa = 0, ρl = 0, ϕt = 0.1, φt = 0.06, αt = 20,
γt = 20, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1 (solid line) and loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (3),
(5), (6), (7) when N = 10, µa = 0.1, µl = 0.1, σa = σ2,t, σl = 0.6, ρa = 0, ρl = 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
T = 1 (dashed line).
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Figure 3: Loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) when
N = 10, µa = 0.1, µl = 0.1, σa = σ3,t, σl = 0.6, ρa = 0, ρl = 0, ϕt = 0.1, φt = 0.06, αt = 10,
γt = 10, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1 (solid line) and loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (3),
(5), (6), (7) when N = 10, µa = 0.1, µl = 0.1, σa = σ3,t, σl = 0.6, ρa = 0, ρl = 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
T = 1 (dashed line).
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Figure 4: Loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) when
N = 10, µa = 0.1, µl = 0.1, σa = σ1,t, σl = 0.6, ρa = 0.5, ρl = 0, ϕt = 0.1, φt = 0.06,
αt = 10, γt = 10, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1 (solid line) and loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of
system (3), (5), (6), (7) when N = 10, µa = 0.1, µl = 0.1, σa = σ1,t, σl = 0.6, ρa = 0.5,
ρl = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1 (dashed line).
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Figure 5: Loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of system (3), (11), (24), (25), (26), (8) when
N = 10, µa = 0.1, µl = 0.1, σa = σ1,t, σl = 0.6, ρa =
√
0.5, ρl = 0, ϕt = 0.1, φt = 0.06,
αt = 10, γt = 10, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1 (solid line) and loss distribution in [0, T ], T = 1, of
system (3), (5), (6), (7) when N = 10, µa = 0.1, µl = 0.1, σa = σ1,t, σl = 0.6, ρa =
√
0.5,
ρl = 0, t ∈ [0, T ], T = 1 (dashed line).
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Experi- σa σl ρa ρl Strategies NSR ( NSR no gov) CcSR CαSR CγSR
ment
1 0.3 0.3 0 0 1a, 2a, 3 0.08 (0.06) 0.28 4.17 4.17
1a, 2b, 3 0.08 (0.06) 0.28 4.17 4.17
2 0.3 0.3 ρ1,t 0 1a, 2a, 3 0.07 (0.13) 0.33 5.59 4.59
1a, 2b, 3 0.06 (0.13) 0.33 5.59 4.59
3 σ4,t 0.3 0 0 1a, 2a, 3 0.17 (0.71) 1.26 12.91 12.91
1a, 2b, 3 0.19 (0.71) 1.21 11.77 11.77
4 σ4,t 0.3 ρ1,t 0 1a, 2a, 3 0.26 (0.77) 1.53 21.99 15.72
1a, 2b, 3 0.25 (0.77) 1.34 19.33 13.07
5 0.3 σ4,t 0 0 1a, 2b, 3 0.20 (0.72) 1.21 11.77 11.77
1b, 2b, 3 0.18 (0.72) 1.11 10.41 10.41
6 0.3 σ4,t 0 ρ1,t 1a, 2b, 3 0.27 (0.77) 1.36 13.45 19.71
1b, 2b, 3 0.50 (0.77) 2.01 24.45 30.69
Table 1: Numerical experiments with µa = µl = 0.1, λi = 0.1, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, ϕ0 = 0.6,
φ0 = 0.2, S1 = 0.01, S2 = 0.05.
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